Space Weather: A Primer
Best-Selling
Author Bobby Akart
Because
you never know when the day before —
is the
day before.
Prepare
for tomorrow!
Author
Bobby Akart, the founder of Freedom Preppers, has been a tireless proponent of
adopting a preparedness lifestyle. As he learned prepping tips and techniques,
he shared them with others via his writing on the American Preppers Network
website, and in his bestselling book series—The
Boston Brahmin and Prepping for
Tomorrow.
In The Boston Brahmin
series, political suspense collides with post-apocalyptic thriller fiction.
Bobby’s attention to detail and real-world scenarios immerses the reader in a
world of geopolitical machinations and post-apocalyptic drama. Preparedness
skills and techniques are interwoven in the plot in way that the reader can be
given a real-world scenario to envision.
The Prepping for
Tomorrow series is the culmination of Bobby’s research and real-world
experiences provided in a concise guide for new and experienced preppers alike.
The Blackout Series is
intended to provide the reader a glimpse into the lives of ordinary Americans
as they face a catastrophic collapse event in the form of a massive coronal
mass ejection.
Space weather is
primarily driven by solar storm phenomena that include coronal mass ejections
(CMEs), solar flares, solar particle events, and solar wind. These phenomena
can occur in various regions on the sun’s surface, but only Earth-directed
solar storms are the potential drivers of space
weather events on Earth. An understanding of solar storm phenomena is an
important component to developing accurate space-weather forecasts (event
onset, location, duration, and magnitude).
CMEs are explosions of
plasma (charged particles) from the sun’s corona. They generally take
twenty-four to forty-eight hours to arrive at Earth, but in the most extreme
cases they have been observed to arrive in as little as fifteen hours. When
CMEs collide with Earth’s magnetic field,
they can cause a space weather event
called a geomagnetic storm, which often includes enhanced aurora displays.
Geomagnetic storms of varying magnitudes can cause significant long- and
short-term impacts to the Nation’s critical infrastructure, including the
electric power grid, aviation systems, Global Positioning System (GPS)
applications, and satellites.
A solar flare is a
brief eruption of intense high-energy electromagnetic radiation from the sun’s
surface, typically associated with sunspots. Solar flares can affect Earth’s
upper atmosphere, potentially causing disruption, degradation, or blackout of
satellite communications, radar, and high-frequency radio communications. The
electromagnetic radiation from the flare takes approximately eight minutes to
reach Earth, and the effects usually last for one to three hours on the
daylight side of Earth.
Solar particle events
are bursts of energetic electrons, protons, alpha particles, and other heavier
particles into interplanetary space. Following an event on the sun, the fastest
moving particles can reach Earth within tens of minutes and temporarily enhance
the radiation level in interplanetary and near-Earth space. When energetic
protons collide with satellites or humans in space, they can penetrate deep
into the object that they collide with and cause damage to electronic circuits
or biological DNA. Solar particle events can also pose a risk to passengers and
crew in aircraft at high latitudes near the geomagnetic poles and can make radio
communications difficult or nearly impossible.
Solar wind, consisting
of plasma, continuously flows from the sun. Different regions of the sun
produce winds of different speeds and densities. Solar wind speed and density
play an important role in space weather. High-speed winds tend to produce
geomagnetic disturbances, and slow-speed winds can bring calm space weather. Space weather effects on Earth are highly
dependent on solar wind speed, solar wind density, and direction of the
magnetic field embedded in the solar wind. When high-speed solar wind overtakes
slow-speed wind or when the magnetic field of solar wind switches polarity,
geomagnetic disturbances can result.
The
Deadly Threat of a Coronal Mass Ejection – Solar Flare
A powerful
electromagnetic pulse, whether resulting from a nuclear-delivered EMP or a
massive solar storm, could collapse the power grid and the critical
infrastructure of our nation.
Is the threat real?
Renowned American astronomer, Phil Plait, who is a self-proclaimed skeptic, is
known as The Bad Astronomer because of his work in debunking common
misunderstandings about space events. "People sometimes ask me if anything
in astronomy worries me," says Plait, when asked about the threat of a
deadly CME. "Something like this is near the top of the list."
There is good reason
to be concerned. A National Academy of Sciences study found there is a twelve
percent chance that a monster solar storm will strike Earth within the next
decade. A solar event of that import could cause two trillion dollars’ worth of
damage in the first year of recovery alone—twenty
times the cost of Hurricane Katrina.
But, what about the
human cost? Studies frequently cite economic loss. How would the destruction of
the power grid and other critical infrastructure; like the internet, banking,
and government be affected? Has such a storm ever hit Earth?
Yes, several times.
Imagine our way of life without power for weeks on end, as a result of a
massive solar flare striking the Earth. It happened in 1859, in what is
commonly referred to as the Carrington Event.
On Sept. 1, 1859,
British astronomer Richard Carrington noticed a brilliant solar flare over
England. In the days that followed, a succession of coronal mass ejections
struck Earth head-on. Auroras illuminated the night sky from Africa to Hawaii.
"The light appeared to cover the whole firmament," one Baltimore
newspaper reported. "It had an indescribable softness and delicacy."
The effects were more than aesthetic. EMPs from the storm caused telegraph
systems — known as the Victorian internet
— to fail throughout North America and Europe; in some cases, lines sparked and
offices caught fire. Otherwise, the damage was minimal.
Nonetheless, for
telegraph operators in the Americas and Europe, the experience caused chaos.
Many found that their lines were just unusable—they could neither send nor
receive messages. Others were able to operate even with their power supplies
turned off, using only the current in the air from the solar storm.
From historical
reports, one telegraph operator said, "The line was in perfect order, and
skilled operators worked incessantly from eight o'clock last evening until one
o’clock this morning to transmit, in an intelligible form, four hundred words
of the report per steamer Indian for the Associated Press."
Other operators
experienced physical danger. Washington, D.C. operator, Frank Royce said,
"I received a very severe electric shock, which stunned me for an instant.
An old man who was sitting facing me, and but a few feet distant, said that he
saw a spark of fire jump from my forehead to the sounder."
At the time, the
telegraph was a new technology and never experienced technical difficulties of
this type. But the story offers an important warning for modern society. The
Carrington Event provides evidence of the fragility of electrical
infrastructure. Scientific American reported in October of 1859: “The
electromagnetic basis of the various phenomena was identified relatively
quickly. A connection between the northern lights and forces of electricity and
magnetism is now fully established."
This event was long
before humanity became utterly reliant on electronics — as it was when history
repeated itself 153 years later.
In 1989, a far smaller
solar flare sent a pulse of radiation that left six million people in Quebec
without power for up to nine hours. Much more alarming, was a solar super storm
that barely missed Earth in July 2012. Astronomers say the sun spewed out a
huge magnetic cloud that tracked straight through our planet’s orbit.
Fortunately, for civilization, the Earth was elsewhere in its path around the
sun at the time but had the storm roared through nine days earlier, a
worst-case scenario would have occurred. Satellites involved in crucial global
communications (including GPS) would have been ruined, large electrical
transformers would have been destroyed, and ATMs would have stopped
functioning. The internet would have been disabled on a massive scale. Most
people wouldn't have been able to flush toilets, which rely on electric pumps.
Three years later,
"we would still be picking up the pieces," says astronomer Daniel
Baker. "The July 2012 storm was, in all respects, at least as strong as
the Carrington Event. The only difference is, it missed."
In a word—TEOTWAWKI—The End Of The
World As We Know It.
Over the last one
hundred and fifty years, the world’s critical infrastructure has become a more
integral part of daily life. In the nineteenth century, telegraphs composed a
comparatively small and relatively non-essential part of everyday life. Their
successors today—including the electrical grid and much of the
telecommunications network—are essential to modern life.
Is the current system
any more protected from catastrophic interference than the telegraph of the
nineteenth century? Can the power grid handle a terrorist attack, or severe
weather events, or a solar storm?
There has never been a
real test to prove it, but there is a robust debate about the vulnerability of
the power grid. The most dangerous and costly possibilities for major
catastrophes, the collapse of the nation’s critical infrastructure, might visit
the United States from any number of methods.
One scenario is a
repeat of the solar storm as big as the 1859 Carrington Event. A solar event of
this significance hasn't struck the earth since, although there have been
smaller ones. As a result of the Quebec blackout in 1989, there were
complications across the interconnected grid and a large transformer in New
Jersey permanently failed.
In 2003, residents of
the northeastern United States experienced a grid-down scenario. It doesn't
take an unprecedented solar flare to knock out power. The combination of a few
trees touching power lines, and a few power companies asleep at the wheel,
plunged a section of the nation into darkness. The darkness can spread. As the
difficulties at Ohio-based FirstEnergy grew and eventually cascaded over the
grid, electrical service from Detroit to New York City was lost. The 2003 event
was a comparatively minor episode, compared to what might have happened. Most
customers had their power back within a couple of days and the transformers
were relatively unaffected.
Compare that event
with the incident in Auckland, New Zealand. Cables supplying power to the
downtown business district failed in 1998. The center of the city went dark.
Companies were forced to shutter or relocate their operations outside of the
affected area. The local Auckland utility had to adopt drastic measures to move
in temporary generators. They even enlisted the assistance of the world's
largest cargo plane—owned by rock band U2,
to transport massive generators into the area. It took five weeks for the power
grid to be fully restored.
There are contrarians.
Jeff Dagle, an electrical engineer at the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, who served on the Northeast Blackout Investigation Task Force
argued, “one lesson of the 2003 blackout is that the power grid is more
resilient than you might think.”
The task force
investigators pinpointed four separate root causes for the collapse, and human
error played a significant role. "It took an hour for it to collapse with
no one managing it," Dagle said. "They would have been just as
effective if they had just gone home for the day. That to me just underscores
how remarkably stable things are."
As awareness was
raised by Congress, the National Academies of Science produced a report
detailing the risk of a significant solar event. The 2008 NAS report paints a
dire picture, based on a study conducted for FEMA and Electromagnetic Pulse
Commission created by Congress.
While severe solar
storms do not occur that often, they have the potential for long-term
catastrophic impacts to the nation’s power grid. Impacts would be felt on
interdependent infrastructures. For example, the potable water distribution
will be affected immediately. Pumps and purification facilities rely on
electricity. The nation’s food supply will be disrupted, and most perishable
foods will spoil and be lost within twenty-four hours. There will be immediate
or eventual loss of heating/air conditioning, sewage disposal, phone service,
transportation, fuel resupply, and many of the necessities that we take for
granted.
According to the EMP
Commission, the effects would be felt for years, and its economic costs could add
up to trillions of dollars—dwarfing the cost of Hurricane Katrina. More
importantly, the commission’s findings stated a potential loss of life that was
staggering. Within one year, according to their conclusions, ninety percent of
Americans would die.
But some skeptics say
it's the opposite. Jon Wellinghoff, who served as Chairman of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission—commonly known as FERC, from 2009 to 2013, has
sounded the alarm about the danger of an attack on the system. The heightened
awareness came as a result of an April 2013 incident in Silicon Valley,
California, in which a group of attackers conducted a coordinated assault on an
electrical substation, knocking out twenty-seven transformers. FERC points to
the fact that the U.S. power grid is broken into three big sections known as interconnections. There is one each for
the Eastern United States, the Western United States, and—out on its own—Texas.
In fact, the East and West interconnections also include much of Canada and
parts of Mexico.
In a 2013 report, FERC
concluded that if a limited number of substations in each of those
interconnections were disabled, utilities would not be able to bring the
interconnections back up again for an indeterminate amount of time. FERC’s
conclusion isn't classified information. This information has been in
government reports and widely disseminated on the internet for years.
FERC also noted that
it could take far longer to return the electrical grid to full functionality
than it did in 2003. Wellinghoff said, "If you destroy the
transformers—all it takes is one high-caliber bullet through a transformer
case, and it's gone, you have to replace it. If there aren't spares on hand—and
in the event of a coordinated attack on multiple substations, any inventory could
be exhausted—it takes months to build new ones.”
"Once your
electricity is out, your gasoline is out, because you can't pump the gas
anymore. All your transportations out, all of your financial transactions are
out, of course because there are no electronics," Wellinghoff also stated.
FERC’s proposed
solution was to break the system into a series of microgrids. In the event of a cascading failure, smaller portions
of the country could isolate themselves from the collapse of the grid. There is
a precedent for this. Princeton University has an independent power grid. When
a large part of the critical infrastructure collapsed during Superstorm Sandy,
the Princeton campus became a place of refuge for residents and a command
center for first responders.
These doomsday
scenarios may be beside the point because the electrical grid is already
subject to a series of dangerous stresses from natural disasters. Sandy showed
that the assumptions used to build many parts of the electrical infrastructure
were wrong. The storm surge overwhelmed the substations, causing them to flood,
and subsequently fail. Experts determined that significant portions of the grid
might need to be moved to higher ground.
Even away from the
coasts, extreme weather can threaten the system in unexpected ways. Some
systems use gas insulation, but if the temperature drops low enough, the gas
composition changes and the insulation fails. Power plants in warmer places
like Texas aren't well-prepared for extreme cold, meaning power-generating plants
could fail when the population needs them the most to provide power for heat.
As utilities rely more heavily on natural gas to generate power, there's a
danger of demand exceeding supply. A likely scenario is a blizzard, in which
everyone cranks up their propane or natural gas-powered heating systems. As the
system becomes overwhelmed, the gas company can't provide to everyone. Power
providers don't necessarily have the first right of refusal from their sources,
so they could lose their supply and be forced to power down in the middle of a
winter storm.
Summer doesn't
necessarily offer any respite. Even prolonged droughts can play a role. As
consumers turn up their air conditioners, requests for more power will
increase. There can be a ratcheting effect. If there are several days of
consistently high temperatures, buildings will never cool completely. The
demand from local utilities will peak higher and higher each day. Power plants
rely upon groundwater to cool their systems. They will struggle to maintain
cooling as the water itself heats up. Droughts can diminish the power from
hydroelectric plants, especially in the western United States.
If such extreme
weather continues to be the norm, the chaos that was unleashed on the grid by
Sandy may have been a preview of the kinds of disruptions to the grid, that
might become commonplace. As the New York Herald argued in 1859, referring to
the Carrington event, "Phenomena are not supposed to have any reference to
things past—only to things to come. Therefore, the aurora borealis must be
connected with something in the future—war, or pestilence, or famine."
Although the impact of solar storms was not fully understood at the time, the
prediction of catastrophe remains valid.
What protective
measures are possible?
The Obama
administration has taken steps to replace some of the aging satellites that
monitor space weather, and extra-high-voltage transformers that are vulnerable
to solar storms. The administration’s new plan also calls for scientists to
establish benchmarks for weather events in space, incorporating something
similar to the Richter scale. The strategy also includes assessing the
vulnerability of the power grid, increasing international cooperation, and
improving solar-flare forecast technology — a crucial step.
But Dr. Peter Pry,
Chairman of the EMP Commission, says that neither the White House, nor
Congress, is taking the threat seriously enough or acting with the appropriate
urgency. According to Dr. Pry, it would cost about two billion dollars— the amount
of foreign aid we give to Pakistan — to harden the nation's power grid to
minimize the damage from either a nuclear EMP or a solar flare. "If we
suspended that [aid] for one year and put it toward hardening the electrical
grid," Pry says, "we could protect the American people from this
threat."
Is
this Science Fiction or Reality?
All of the events
described above are plausible and have their roots in history. What could
happen? Global Panic. Martial Law. Travel Restrictions. Food and Water
Shortages. An Overload of the Medical System. Societal Collapse. Economic
Collapse.
This is why we prep.
Prepping is insurance against both natural and man-made catastrophic events.
The government now requires you to carry medical insurance. Your homeowner's
insurance may include damage from tornadoes. Even though you may never incur
damage from a tornado, you pay for that coverage monthly nonetheless. This is
what preppers do. We allocate time and resources to protect our families, in
the event of seemingly unlikely events, but events that are occurring daily or
have historical precedent.
We hope America is
never impacted by a major space weather event, but what if?
This is a true story, it just hasn’t happened yet.